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LIST OF PARTIES
At the time of preparation of this Petition the parties to
this action are the same as those listed on the caption except as
noted below.
This appeal only directly involves the Plaintiffs
and the Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman who was dismissed from
the action over the Plaintiffs1 objection*
The Defendants Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and Coffman, Coffman
and Woods, a professional corporation, who are not parties to
this appeal, are represented by Tim Dalton Dunn who also
represents the Defendant-Respondent Penelope Dalton Coffman in
this appeal.
The Defendant Anthony M. Thurber, who is not a party to this
appeal, is represented by Thomas L. Kay, P.O. Box 45385, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84145-0385.
The Defendant Kenneth A. Okazaki has been voluntarily
dismissed from the action and is not a party to this appeal.
Arron F. Jepson, who is not a party to this appeal, has been
added as a defendant to the action in the district court and is
represented by D. Gary Christian, City Center I, Suite 330, 175
East 400 South 84111-2314.
Stephen R. Madsen, who is not a party to this appeal, has
been added as a defendant to the action in the district court but
has not yet been served or appeared herein.
Donald E. Elkins, who is not a party to this appeal, has
been added as a defendant to the action in the district court and
has appeared pro se and also as counsel for the partnership of
Madsen, Jepson & Elkins which has also been added as a defendant
in the district court and is not a party to this appeal. Mr.
Elkin's address is 60 East 100 South, Suite 200, Provo, Utah
84601.

stewapp.prt

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT AND UNOFFICIAL
OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATEMENT

OF

GROUNDS

ON

WHICH

REPORTS OF
2

JURISDICTION OF SUPREME

COURT IS INVOKED

2

(a)

THE DATE OF ENTRY OF DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED

2

(b)
(c)

THE DATE OF THE ENTRY OF ORDER RESPECTING REHEARING
RELIANCE UPON RULE 44 (c), WHERE A CROSS-PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS FILED

3
3

THE STATUTORY PROVISION BELIEVED TO CONFER ON
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DECISION
IN QUESTION BY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

3

(d)

CONTROLLING PROVISION OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES,ORDINANCES,
AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

NATURE OF THE CASE

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT

6

MEMBERS OF LAW FIRMS INCORPORATED UNDER THE UTAH
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ACT
ARE VICARIOUSLY
LIABLE FOR
THE ACTIONS
OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
CORPORATION EVEN ABSENT
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN
THE REPRESENTATION
OF A CLIENT.
THEREFORE, THE
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION MUST BE REVERSED . . • •

8

POINT I
THE CASES RAISES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION REGARDING
THE PRACTICE OF LAW WHICH
HAS NOT
BEEN, BUT
SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT
iii

8

POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE
TRADITIONAL
PARTNERSHIP
LIABILITY
WHICH
ATTACHED TO LAW FIRMS, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT AND CONFLICTING
DECISIONS BY OTHER COURTS

9

POINT III
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO
ADDRESS THE PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW AND IGNORED THE UTAH CONSTITUTION'S MANDATE
THAT THE PRACTICE OF LAW BE REGULATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, RATHER THAN BY THE LEGISLATURE . . .

12

POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FOUND THAT THE RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DO NOT OF THEMSELVES CREATE
A BASIS OF LIABILITY. HOWEVER, ASSUMING SUCH TO BE
TRUE, NEITHER DO THE RULES ABROGATE THE ESTABLISHED
LAW ABOVE SET FORTH

16

APPENDIX

17

CONCLUSION

17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IV

STEAPPL.TAB

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

Page

First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 GA. 844, 302 SE 2d
674, (1983), 39 ALR 4th 551, on remand, Zagoria v. Du
Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga App 120, 306 SE 2d 433. 11,13
In

Re Disciplinary Action of McCune, Utah, 717 P.2d 701,
704-5 (1986)

Petition of Bar Asso., 55 Hawaii
(1973)

8,13

121, 516, P.2d 1267
9,10

South High Development Limited v. Weyner, Lippe and
Cromley Co., L.P.A., 445 N.E.2d 1106 (Ohio, 1983). . .

11

Williams v. Burns, 463 F Supp 1278, (D.C. Colo, 1979) . .

9

CONSTITUTIONS CITED
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4

3,4,13

Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1,
1985)

(Pre-July 1,
3,13

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2 (3) (a)

3

Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-2-2 (2) . .

3

Utah Professional Corporation Act,
Section 16-11-1s

Utah

4,9

Utah Professional Corporation Act, Utah
Section 16-11-3,
Utah Professional Corporation Act,
Section 16-11-1C)

Utah

v

Code Annotated,
4,10,12
Code Annotated,
5,10,12

Utah Professional Corporation Act, Utah
Section 16-11-5
Utah Professional Corporation Act,
Section 68-3-12 (5)

Code Annotated,

Utah

Code Annotated,
5
Code Annotated,
5,10,12

Utah Partnership
48-1-10

Act, Utah

4

Utah Partnership Act, Utah
48-1-11
Utah Partnership
48-1-12

Code Annotated 1953, Section
Code Annotated 1953, Section
4

Act, Utah

Code Annotated 1953, Section
4
RULES CITED

Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.8 (h)
Rule 5.1
Rule 8.4 (a)

5
5,6
6

Rule 54 (b) Utah Rules Civil Procedure

8

Rule 43 (4) Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

9

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Legislative History . .

6,10,12

VI

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARLIN L. STEWART and CANDICE
STEWART, husband and wife,

P l a i n t i f f s-AppeHants ,

Certiorari No.

vs •

Category No. 13

ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS, a
professional corporation also
known as COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, jointly
and severally,

(Case No. 860318-CA in
Court of Appeals;
originally No. 860167
in[ Supreme Court)

Defendants.
(PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
Defendant-Respondent)
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
The

above

Plaintiffs-Appellants

hereby

petition the Utah

Supreme Court to review the Opinion of the Utah Court
in the

of Appeals

above matter dated and filed January 12, 1988, appeal No.

860318-CA, copy attached.
1.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

is whether

a shareholder

The sole issue on appeal

of a law firm organized under the Utah

Professional Corporation Act

is vicariously liable for

or omissions of another shareholder of the firm.
1

the acts

The Petitioners

seek a reversal of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which
upheld the decision of the
Grand County

Seventh

Judicial

District

Court of

in dismissing Penelope Dalton Coffman (Penelope), a

shareholder of an incorporated law firm,
The Petitioners

from the

above action.

submit that the decision of the Court of Appeals

failed to consider and

address the

professional aspects

of the

practice of law, contrary holdings by the courts of other States,
the

legislative

history

Corporation Act,

and the

decision since the practice

and

intent

of

the

Professional

constitutional implications of the its
of law

is regulated

by the Supreme

Court rather than the legislature.
2•

REFERENCE TO

OPINION ISSUED BY THE
issued its

OFFICEAL REPORT AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF
COURT OF

written opinion

APPEALS.

on January

denied by order dated January 27, 1988.

The Court
12, 1988.

of Appeals

Rehearing was

The opinion has reported

in 73 Utah Advance Reports at page 119.
3.

STATEMENT OF

COURT IS INVOKED.

GROUNDS ON

WHICH JURISDICTION OF SUPREME

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the

Seventh Judicial District Court for Grand County.
originally to the Supreme Court (No. 860167) but
to the

Court of Appeals.

The appeal was
was transferred

Review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals is now sought.
(a)

The Date Of Entry

Of Decision
2

Sought To

Be Reviewed:

The

decision

sought

to

be

reviewed

was dated and entered on

January 12, 1988.
(b)

The Date

Of The

Entry Of

Order Respecting Rehearing:

of Appeals 1 order denying the Plaintiffs 1 petition for

The Court

rehearing was entered on January 27, 1988.
(c)
Writ Of

Reliance Upon Rule 44(c), Where A
Certiorari Is

Filed:

Cross-Petition For A

Not applicable.

This

is not a

cross-petition for certiorari.
(d)

The Statutory Provision Believed

Court Jurisdiction
Of Certiorari:
provides

the

To Review

judgment of the Court
2(2)

provides

the

Court

issue extraordinary writs.
the

Utah

Constitution

the Utah

Code Annotated

with appellate jurisdiction over a

of Appeals.
Supreme

On Supreme

The Decision In Question By A Writ

Section 78-2-2(3)(a) of
Supreme

To Confer

Additionally,

Section 78-2-

Court with original jurisdiction to
Further, Article

imposes

upon

this

VIII, Section
Court

the

4 of

duty to

regulate the practice of law.
4.

CONTROLLING

PROVISIONS

OF

CONSTITUTIONS,

STATUTES,

ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED.
Utah

State

Constitution,

Article

VIII, Section 1 (Pre-July 1,

1985):
The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in the
Senate sitting
as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme
Court, in district courts, in justices of the peace,
and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as
3

may be established by law.
Utah State

Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4 (Effective July

1, 1985) :
. .. The supreme court by rule shall govern the practice
of law, including admission to practice law and the
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law,
Utah General
amended:

Partnership

Act,

Utah

Code

Annotated

1953, as

48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act.
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner
acting in the ordinary course of the business of the
partnership or with the authority of his copartners
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred,
the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent
as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
48-1-11.
Partnership bound by partner's breach of
trust. The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his
apparent authority receives money or property of a
third person and misapplies it; and,
(2)
Where the partnership in the course of its
business receives money or property of a third person
and the money or property so received is misapplied by
any partner
while it is in the custody of the
partnership.
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability.
All partners are liable:
(1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to
the partnership under sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the
partnership; but any partner may enter into a separate
obligation to perform a partnership contract.
The Utah Professional Corporation Act, Section 16-11-1 et seq.:
16-11-3.
construed

Purpose of act.—This act shall be so
as to effectuate its general purpose of
4

making available
to professional
persons the benefits
of the corporate form for the business aspects of their
practices while preserving the established professional
aspects of
the personal
relationship between
the
professional person and those he serves.
16-11-10.
Laws as to professional relationships not
altered.--This act does not alter any law applicable to
the
relationship
between
a
person
rendering
professional
services and
a person
receiving
such
services f
including
liability
arising
out of
such
professional services.
16-11-5. Application of Utah Business Corporation Act
— Conflicts.
The Utah Business Corporation Act shall
be applicable to professional
corporations, and they
shall enjoy the powers and privileges and be subject to
the duties, restrictions
and
liabilities of
other
corporations, except where inconsistent with this act.
This act shall take precedence
in the event of any
conflict with
the provisions of
the Utah Business
Corporation Act or other laws.
Section 68-3-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended:
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and
corporate, partnerships, associations, and companies.
Rule 1.8(h) of the Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively
limiting
the
lawyer's liability
to a
client
for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is
independently represented in making the agreement . . .
Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct:
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable
efforts to insure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance
that all
lawyers
in the
firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b)
. . .
A lawyer shall be responsible for
another
lawyer's
violations
of
the
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct
if:
. . . (2) The lawyer is a
partner in the law
firm
in which
the other lawyer

5

practices or has direct supervisory authority over the
other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when
its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails
to take reasonable remedial action.
Comment to Rule 5.1 of Rules of Professional Conduct:
Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not
have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a
partner, associate or subordinate.
Whether a lawyer
may be
liable civilly or criminally for another
lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope
of these Rules.
Terminology section of Rules of Professional Practice:
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership or a
shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional
corporation."
Legislative History.
5.

(Set forth in Appendix).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Nature of the Case

This is

a legal

malpractice case.

the Utah Supreme Court from

a

defendant

Coffman

Penelope

Dalton

final

Plaintiffs appealed to

dismissal

which dismissed

(Penelope)

from the action

brought by the Plaintiffs in the Seventh Judicial
of

Grand

County

against several attorneys including defendants

Penelope and Aldine J.
transferred

to

District Court

the

Coffman,
Court

Jr.

(Aldine).

The

case was

of Appeals which upheld the district

court's dismissal of Penelope.
Statement of Facts
At the

time the

suit was

filed, Penelope
6

and Aldine were

members

of

Coffman,

Coffman

corporation,

Penelope filed

defendant for

failure of

upon which relief
because there

Woods,

a motion

plaintiffs to

could

were "no

and

be

granted.

a

professional

to dismiss

herself as a

state a cause of action
The

motion

was denied

facts presented from which the Court can

find as a matter of undisputed fact that this Defendant, contrary
to

the

allegations

of

the

Complaint,

involvement in the matters alleged."
Penelope filed

had not (sic) personal

(R. 30-58).

Subsequently

a motion to reconsider supported by her affidavit

(R. 59-61; 70-71) in which she stated:
2. Affiant is a member
Coffman (and) Woods.

of the

law firm Coffman,

3. The law firm Coffman, Coffman (and) Woods is a
professional corporation.
4. Affiant has not at any time
represent (plaintiffs) in an matter.

undertaken to

5.
Affiant has not corresponded at any time with
the (plaintiffs), or either of them, with regard to any
legal matter .
6.
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, affiant
never saw the file, never knew the contents of the
file, never discussed with any other member of the
lawfirm (sic) the contents of the file, and cannot
contribute any information through discovery, having no
personal (knowledge) of any of the events leading up to
the filing of this lawsuit.
The motion to dismiss was granted.
its

order

undisputed

of

dismissal,

facts

showed

the
that

trial

(R. 72-74; 135-137).
court

stated

that

In
the

Coffman, Coffman and Woods was a
7

P.C. and

"although (Penelope),

she had no personal
alleged in

is a member of that corporation,

or professional

involvement in

the matters

plaintiffs1 Complaint, the Court concluded

matter of law from those undisputed facts that there is
of

against

(Penelope)."

The

no cause

Court's

judgment as to

Penelope was ordered final pursuant to Rule 54(b)

URCP. (R. 144-

6).

action

(sic) as a

The appeal process then commenced, resulting in the opinion

of the Court of Appeals upholding the trial court's decision.
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
MEMBERS OF LAW FIRMS INCORPORATED UNDER THE UTAH
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT ARE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR
THE ACTIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION EVEN
ABSENT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REPRESENTATION OF A
CLIENT. THEREFORE, THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION MUST
BE REVERSED
I.
THE CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION REGARDING THE
PRACTICE OF LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE,
SETTLED BY THIS COURT.
This Court is charged under the Utah State Constitution with
regulating the

In Re

Disciplinary Action of

McCune, Utah, 717 P.2d 701, 704-5 (1986) .

The issue of vicarious

liability for

practice of

members of

law.

professional law

corporations has not

been considered by this Court.

The Utah Bar Association and Utah

Trial Lawyers Association have

in

opposite

stands

as

amicus

complex and significant.

the

curiae,

All Utah
8

Court
showing

lawyers and

of

Appeals taken

that the issue is
the public they

serve are

affected by this issue*

is an important matter which should
Court should
the

Rules

exercise its
of

the

Utah

Accordingly, the issue raised
be settled

discretion pursuant
Supreme

Court

and

by review.

The

to Rule 43(4) of
issue

a

writ of

certiorari.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
TRADITIONAL PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY WHICfl ATTACHED TO LAW
FIRMS, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION ACT AND CONFLICTING DECISIONS BY OTHER
COURTS.
Aldine and

Penelope are

each members

of the Defendant law

firm Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation.
24-29;

32-34;

59-61).

(R.

The professional corporation, if it in

fact exists, must be incorporated

under

authority

of

the Utah

Professional Corporation Act, Section 16-11-1 et seq. of the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
Prior to the adoption of the Professional Corporation Act in
1963, law

firms necessarily

existed in the form of partnerships

subject to the liabilities imposed by partnership law.
of Bar

Asso.,

55 Hawaii 121, 516 P.2d 1267 (1973).

Burns, 463 F Supp 1278, (D.C. Colo, 1979).
and 12

Williams v.
48-1-10, 11

of the Utah General Partnership Act, which was adopted in

1921, provided that the
date

Sections

Petition

liability

arose

partnership and
are

all partners

as of the

jointly and severally liable for the

wrongful acts or omissions of any partner acting
9

in the ordinary

course of

business.

Sections 16-11-3 and 10 of the Professional

Corporation Act state that although the
the use

of the

act allows professionals

corporate form for business purposes, the act is

not intended to alter
professional and

the professional

his client

relationship between the

and specifically is not intended to

alter any law of liability applicable to the relationship*
Section 16-11-3 provides that
available

"to

professional

the

corporate

persons".

includes professional partnerships

form

is made

"Professional persons"

since

Section

68-3-12(5) of

the Utah Code Annotated provides that "person" in a statute shall
be

construed

to

mean

legislative history,

partnerships

set forth

in the

legislature did not

intend

liability regarding

law firms.

Rules of

Professional

professional

and

to

Practice

responsibilities

alter

associations.

The

appendix, shows that the
the

traditional

form of

Even the terminology section of
recognize
for

identical continuing

partnership

members

and

professional corporation members:
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership or a
shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional
corporation."
Therefore, the preexisting status of law

firm members being

vicariously liable

for the professional misdeeds of their fellow

members

applicable

remains

corporations.

In

Petition

to
of
10

Bar

members

of

professional

Assoc., Supra, the Hawaii

Supreme

Court

recognized

incorporated law
should not

firms for

be limited

Development

the

liability

the malpractice

The same result

Limited

v.

Weyner,

L.P.A., 445 N.E.2d 1106 (Ohio, 1983).
v. Zagoria,

250 GA.

of attorneys of

of their associates

and that the partnership law of liability

should continue to apply.
High

that

was reached

Lippe

and

in South

Cromley Co.,

In First Bank

& Trust Co.

844, 302 SE 2d 674, (1983), 39 ALR 4th 551,

on remand, Zagoria v. Du Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga
306 SE

2d 433, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously held that a

lawyer who holds himself out as a member
it is

App 120,

of a

law firm, whether

a partnership or a professional corporation, is liable for

the professional misconduct of other
when the

lawyer has

gave rise to the

members

of

the

firm even

had no involvement in the transaction which

liability.

The

Court

Appeals1 decision

of

ignored this authority.
The Court of Appeals emphasized the words, "for the business
aspects" when

quoting Section

Its

was

decision

based

16-11-3 UCA.

upon

the

erroneous

liability of law firm members to law firm
aspect of
it

is

not

the practice
intended

of law.
"to

alter

(Slip.

Op. at 3 ) .

impression

clients is

that

a business

The statute expressly says that
any

law

applicable

to

the

relationship between a person rendering professional services and
a

person

receiving

such

services,
11

including

liability ...".

(Section

16-11-10,

partnerships
partnerships.

emphasis

(Section
The

68-3-12(5))

corporate

lawyer with tax advantages
clearly being

added.)

members

and,

therefore,

(Legislative history,

page 4 ) , taxes

a "business aspect" of the practice of law.

from

legal

form was intended to provide the

the corporate form might arguably
firm

Again, "person" includes

individual

be

construed

liability

to

While

protect law

to a delivery man who

slips and falls in the office lobby, or from individual liability
to pay for office supplies ("business aspects" of the practice of
law) it

cannot

be

construed

professional services
construing professional

to

rendered.

limit

liability

The Court

liability to

be a

relating to

of Appeals erred in
"business aspect" of

the practice of law.
TIC.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADDRESS
THE PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND
IGNORED THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S MANDATE THAT THE
PRACTICE OF LAW BE REGULATED BY THE SUPREME COURT,
RATHER THAN BY THE LEGISLATURE.
The Court

of Appeal!s decision rests on the assumption that

the practice of law is just another business which is
regulation by the legislature.

subject to

Such assumption is invalid.

Even

if, arguendo, the legislature's clear statement in Section 16-1110 of

the Professional

Corporation Act is incorrectly construed

to find legislative intent to alter the professional relationship
12

between clients

and law firms, such an interpretation assumes an

unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature.
of regulating

the professional

the Supreme Court,
Action of

not

the

conduct of

The power

attorneys rests with

legislature.

In

Re Disciplinary

McCune, Utah, 717 P.2d 701, 704-5 (1986); First Bank &

Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 GA. 844, 302 SE 2d 674, (1983),
4th 551,

39 ALR

on remand, Zagoria v. Du Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga

App 120, 306 SE 2d 433.
1985 Utah

Article VIII,

Constitution conferred

Section 1

and the

of the pre-

current Article VIII,

Section 4 of the Constitution confers the power of regulating the
practice of

law on the Supreme Court.

of McCune, supra, p.704.
the professional

In Re Disciplinary Action

The legislature has

relationship between

no power

to alter

clients and law firms who

represent them and the Professional Corporation Act should not be
interpreted to
unless

the

find such

Court

is

an abuse
willing

of power
to

also

by the legislature
declare

the

act

unconstitutional.
In Zagoria,

supra. at

page 553

of 39 ALR 4th, the Georgia

Supreme Court stated:
We do not view this case as one in which we need to
interpret the statute providing for the creation and
operation of professional corporations. We rather view
this case as one which calls for the exercise of this
court's authority to regulate the practice of law.
This court has the authority and in fact the duty to
regulate the law practice and in the past two decades
we have been diligent in our exercise of this duty....
13

The diligence of this court has been directed toward
the assurance that the
law practice
will be a
professional service
and not simply a commercial
enterprise.
The primary
distinction is
that a
profession is a calling which demands adherence to the
public interest as the foremost obligation of the
practitioner.
The professional corporation statute
should be interpreted with this thought in mind.
The
legislature has the clear right to enact technical
rules for the creation and operation of professional
corporation, but it cannot constitutionally cross the
gulf separating the branches of government by imposing
regulations upon the practice of law.
e court further appropriately stated:
The shareholders of a professional Corporation have the
same insulation from liability as shareholders of other
corporations with respect to obligations of a purely
business and nonprofessional nature.
However, the
influence
of
the
statute upon the professional
corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law
practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for
acts of malpractice obligations incurred because of a
breach of a duty to a client.
The professional nature of the law practice and its
obligations to the public interest require that each
lawyer be civilly responsible for his professional
acts. A lawyer's relationship to his client is a very
special one.
So also in the relationship between a
lawyer and the other members of his or her firm a
special one.
When a client engages the services of a
lawyer the client has the right to expect the fidelity
of other members of the firm. It is inappropriate for
the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek
in the
shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape
the responsibilities of professionalism.

We cannot allow a corporate veil to hang from the
cornices of professional corporations which engage in
the law practice.
., p. 554-5.
14

Once the high ethical duties inherent in the practice of law
are brought into consideration it becomes
must

adopt

the

holding

of

legislature has no power to
charged with

the high

the practice of law.
double standard

the

The

Georgia

ignore,

duty to

and

Supreme
the

this Court
Court.

Supreme

The

Court is

assure, the highest integrity of

practice

of liability

clear that

of

law

cannot

tolerate a

between attorneys who practice law

by traditional partnership and those who choose to

operate their

partnerships as "professional corporations".
The decision

of the Court of Appeals invites the "hide-and-

seek" games feared by the court

in

ZagorJQ.

One

can readily

foresee "professional corporations" wherein profit sharing occurs
but

each

system,

"shareholder"
his

own

privately

computer,

corporation itself

owns

no

owns

copier

a

different reporting

and other equipment and the

physical

assets

subject

to levy.

Lawyers will enjoy the benefit of shared profits without the risk
of losses
class.

and rightly
One

can

retain the

also

foresee,

public image
as

a

of a privileged

result of the Court of

Appeal 1 s decision, shareholders who

are, in

in a

as co-counsel and lurking in

case, not

listing themselves

the shadows so as to not be detected
client.

The public

thus becomes

by a

fact, participating

potentially aggrieved

the victim of a game of hide-

and-seek enjoyed by a class which, while ostensibly burdened with
15

high duties

to the public, in fact enjoys high privileges at the

expense of the public.
The public deserves more from the
receives from

the decision

should issue a writ

legal profession

of the Court of Appeals.

of certiorari

and upon

than it

This Court

review, reverse the

decision of the Court of Appeals.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FOUND THAT THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DO NOT OF THEMSELVES CREATE A
BASIS OF LIABILITY. HOWEVER, ASSUMING SUCH TO BE TRUE,
NEITHER DO THE RULES ABROGATE THE ESTABLISHED LAW ABOVE
SET FORTH.
The

Court

of

Appeals

erroneously

found that traditional
to lawyers1

principals of business corporation liability applies
malpractice.

(Slip op.

at 3-4).

It then stated regarding the

Rules of Professional Responsibility:
Clearly the Utah Supremo Court is only concerned with
potential disciplinary actions and liability.
In
regulating the practice of law, the Supreme Court has
done nothing to change those principle of corporate law
discussed earlier .
(Slip op. at 6 ) . The
recognizing

that

the

Court of
Rules

Appeals is
of

at least

Professional

Conduct

abrogate existing law regarding professional liability.
it

errors

in

applying

established principals of
profession have

business

corporation

professional

correct in

liability

law
in

do

not

However,
where

the

the legal

included vicarious liability as discussed above.
16

6.

APPENDIX.

An appendix

is attached which contains the

following:
Opinion of Court of Appeals.
Order denying Petition for Rehearing
Affidavit of Penelope Dalton Coffman
District Court's Ruling on Motion To
Dismiss

Reconsider Motion to

Legislative History
CONCLUSION
A writ of certiorari should immediately issue.
Appeals1 and trial court's
event

that

the

reviewed, Penelope
and bound

action

decisions must
has

been

Dalton Coffman

tried

The Court of

be reversed.

In the

before this appeal is

should be

ordered subject to

by any judgment entered against Aldine J. Coffman, Jr.

and/or the professional corporation.
Respectfully submitted this

/<)

day of February, 1988.

*<<<*. - 'C* - -.
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
stewapp.crt
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-0O0January 12, 1988 - Opinion by Judge Richard C. Davidson
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Judge Norman H. Jackson
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Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered that the dismissal of the trial court be and the same
is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiffs.
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correct copy of the attached opinion was mailed to each of the above
parties and to the trial court.
Julia Whitfield
Case Management Clerk
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Marlin L. Stewart and Candice
Stewart, Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr., and
Penelope Dalton Coffman,
Coffman, Coffman and Woods,
a professional corporation
also known as Coffman and
Coffman, Anthony ML Thurber,
and Kenneth A. Okazaki,
jointly and severally,

Case No. S60318-CA

JAN

1 Q -fv

Defendants and Respondent,
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Davidson,

DAVIDSON, Judge:
Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment of dismissal
which dismissed defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman (Penelope)
from a legal malpractice action brought by plaintiffs against
several attorneys including defendants Penelope and Aldine J.
Coffman, Jr. (Aldine). We affirm.
At the time the suit was filed, Penelope and Aldine were
members of Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a professional
corporation. Penelope filed a motion to dismiss herself as a
defendant for failure of plaintiffs to state a cause of action
upon which relief could be granted. The motion was denied
because there were "no facts presented from which the Court can
find as matter of undisputed fact that this Defendant, contrary
to the allegations of the Complaint, had not [sic] personal
involvement in the matters alleged." Subsequently, Penelope
filed a motion to reconsider supported by her affidavit in
which she stated:

iii

2.

Affiant is a member of the law firm
Coffman, Coffman [and] Woods.

3.

The law firm Coffman, Coffman [and]
Woods is a professional corporation.

4.

Affiant has not at any time
undertaken to represent [plaintiffs]
in any matter.

5*

Affiant has not corresponded at any
time with the [plaintiffs], or either
of them, with regard to any legal
matter.

6.

Prior to the filing of this lawsuit,
affiant never saw the file, never
knew the contents of the file, never
discussed with any other member of
the lawfirm [sic] the contents of the
file, and cannot contribute any
information through discovery, having
no personal [knowledge] of any of the
events leading up to the filing of
this lawsuit.

The motion to dismiss was granted.
In its order of
dismissal, the trial court stated that the undisputed facts
showed that Coffman, Coffman and Woods was a P.C. and "although
[Penelope], is a member of that corporation, she had no
personal or professional involvement in the matters alleged in

plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court concluded [sic] as a matter of
law from those undisputed facts that there is no cause of
action against [Penelope]."
The issue on appeal is whether a shareholder of a law
firm organized under the Utah Professional Corporation Act
(UPCA) is vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of
another shareholder of the firm.
The appropriate standard of review dictates that "we
accord conclusions of law no particular deference, but review
them for correctness."
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985) .

860318-CA
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THE UTAH PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT
The UPCA is delineated in Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-11-1 to
-15 (1987). UPCA's purpose, is stated in § 16-11-3:
This act shall be so construed as to
effectuate its general purpose of making
available to professional persons the
benefits of the corporate form for the
business aspects of their practices while
preserving the established professional
aspects of the personal relationship between
the professional person and those he serves.
(Emphasis added.) In § 16-11-10, professional relationships
are specifically addressed:
This act does not alter any law applicable
to the relationship between a person
rendering professional services and a
person receiving such services, including
liability arising out of such professional
services.
These sections establish that the UPCA provides the
benefits of corporate status to professional corporations, but
there is nothing therein which creates or extends vicarious
liability to other shareholders.
The UPCA, in § 16-11-5, emphasizes that professional
corporations are to be treated as other corporations:
The Utah Business Corporation Act shall be
applicable to professional corporations,
and they shall enjoy the powers and
privileges and be subject to the duties,
restrictions and liabilities of other
corporations, except where inconsistent
with this act. This act shall take
precedence in the event of any conflict
with provisions of the Utah Business
Corporation Act or other laws.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International
Systems & Controls Corp., 294 Or. 94, 654 P.2d 1092 (1982),

860318-CA

presented a lengthy discussion concerning exceptions to
shareholder immunity in the context of general corporate law.
However, the general rule is described as follows:
The question of when and under what
circumstances a shareholder becomes liable
for a corporate obligation has troubled
judges and lawyers for a century or so.
Although corporate shareholders were not
insulated from liability for debts of the
corporation in common law England,
shareholder insulation from such liability
has been a cornerstone of corporate law in
the United States since the nineteenth
century. Virtually every state has a
statute similar to [Oregon's],1 which
limits a shareholder's liability to the
cost of the shares held.
Id. at 1096 (footnotes omitted). Following this general
interpretation of corporate law and finding no specific
justification in either the UPCA or the Utah Business
Corporation Act, we hold that a shareholder in a corporation
organized under the UPCA is not vicariously liable for the acts
or omissions of another shareholder in the performance of
professional service unless that shareholder has participated
in the alleged acts or omissions.
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The Utah Constitution art. VIII, § 4 states "The supreme
court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of
persons admitted to practice law." See In re Disciplinary
Action of McCune, 717 P.2d 701, 704 n.2 (Utah 1986); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-4(3) (1987). It is argued that the Supreme Court,
by adopting the Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct,
scheduled to be effective January 1, 1988, has created
vicarious liability for shareholder attorneys. However, this
is not the case. The Scope section of the Proposed Rules
contains the following statements:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-23 (1987).

860318-CA
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Failure to comply with an obligation or
prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis
for involving the disciplinary process..
Violation of a Rule should not give rise
to a cause of action nor should it create
any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached. The Rules are designed to
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide
a structure for regulating conduct through
disciplinary agencies* They are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability.
Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should be
deemed to augment any substantive legal
duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary
consequences of violating such a duty.
In the Terminology section, "partner" is defined as "[denoting]
a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law firm
organized as a professional corporation."
Rule 5.1 delineates the responsibilities of a partner or
supervisory lawyer in law firms and associations. Rule 5.1(a)
states a partner's obligation is to ensure reasonable efforts
are made to be sure that all lawyers within the firm conform to
the Rules. Rule 5.1(b) specifically requires supervisory
lawyers to make reasonable efforts to ensure those lawyers they
supervise conform to the Rules.
Rule 5.1(c) states:
A lawyer shall be responsible for
another lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if:

860318-CA

(1)

the lawyer orders or, with knowledge
of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or

(2)

the lawyer is a partner in the law
firm in which the other lawyer
practices, or has direct supervisory
authority over the other lawyer, and
knows of the conduct at a time when
its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take
reasonable remedial action.

5
vi i

The Comment to Rule 5.1 is also instructive. "Apart from this
Rule and Rule 8.4(a),2 a lawyer does not have disciplinary
liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or
subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or
criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law
beyond the scope of these Rules." Clearly the Utah Supreme
Court is only concerned with potential disciplinary actions and
has specifically refrained from addressing questions of civil
liability. In regulating the practice of law, the Supreme Court
has done nothing to change those principles of corporate law
discussed earlier.
The dismissal of the trial court is affirmed,
plaintiffs.

Costs against

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

2. Rule 8.4(a): It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another.

860318-CA
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
—oOo—
Marlin L. Stewart and Candice Stewart,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr., Penelope Dalton
Coffman, Coffman, Coffman and Woods,
a professional corporation also known as
Coffman and Coffman, Anthony M. Thurber,
and Kenneth A, Okazaki, jointly and severally,
Defendants and Respondent.

ORDER
860318-CA

Pursant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 3(a),
appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated this 27th day of January, 1988.
FOR THE COURT:

Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of January, 1988, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed to
each of the following:
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq.
131 East 100 South
P.O. Box 339
Moab, UT 84532-0339
Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq*
230 South 500 East 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
William W. Barrett, Esq.
600 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Thomas L. Kay, Esq.
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Stephen J. Hill, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Robert H. Wilde, Esq.
6925 Union Park Center, #490
Midvale, UT 84047

Julia C. Whitfield
Case/Management Clerk
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friM DALTON DUNN/ Bar #0936
ANNE SWENSEN, Bar #4252
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
[Attorneys for Defendants
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
[Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
iTelephone : (801) 363-7611

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (:OURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARLIN L . STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife t

AFFIDAVIT OF
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN

Plaintiffs,
Civil No »

vs.
ALDINE J . COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS,
a professional corporation,
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI,
jointly and severally,
t

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH )
: ss
GRAND COUNTY )
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, being first duly sworn, on oath
deposes and says:

XI

1. Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice lav; in
the State of Utah.
2.

Affiant is a member of the law firm Coffman, Coffman

3.

The law firm Coffman, Coffman & Woods is a

& Wood*

professional corporation.
4.

Affiant has not at any time undertaken to represent

Marlin L. Stewart or Candice Stewart in any matter*
5.

Affiant has not corresponded at any time with the

Stewarts, or either of them, with regard to any legal matter.
6.

Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, affiant never

saw the file, never knew the contents of the file, never
discussed with any other member of the lawfirm the contents of
the file, and cannot contribute any information through
discovery, having no personl knowedge of any of the events
leading up to the filing of this lawsuit.
DATED this

u?

• day of January, 1986.

VvtOO

PENELOPEI DALTON
DALTON COFFMAN
COFF>

•2xii

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this

///?"//

day of

January, 1986*

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing a t :

^

nioaJe tool,

My Commission Expires:

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this
/(, U,

day of January, 1986, a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing to: '
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
131 East 100 South
P.O. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532-0339

'Ybifid^£mvMtiy
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936
ANNE SWENSEN, -Bar #4252
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone : (801) 363-7611

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife,
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

Civil No. 5370

ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS,
a professional corporation,
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI,
jointly and severally,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN moves the court to
reconsider its ruling on her Motion to Dismiss.

xiv

The court denied this defendant's Motion to Dismiss on
January 15, 1986*

That ruling was apparently made prior to the

court's receipt of this defendant's Reply Memorandum and
supporting Affidavit*
This defendant therefore respectfully requests that the
court reconsider its Motion to Dismiss, including the Reply
Memorandum and Affidavit currently on file herein.
DATED this

^^

day of January, 1986.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

Is)
ANNE SWENSEN

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this
- f>£? ^

day of

j a n u a r y f 1986, a true #nd accurate copy of the

foregoing to:
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
131 East 100 South
P.O. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532-0339
~')
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ATTACHMENT A

1
2
3

HOUSE BILL 197
INCORPORATION OF PERSONS
RENDERING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

4
5

Sponsors:

6

BILL SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR MARCH 19, 1963

7
8

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATE, THIRD DISCUSSION

9
10

MR.
benefits

(inaudible)

11
12

Reed A. Watkins, Eighth District
J. Robert Bullock, Eleventh District
George R. Aiken, Twenty-Sixth District

SPEAKER:

To incorporate for tax

Representative Watkins?

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:
Committee

I move we accept the

report.

13

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

14

SPEAKER:

Thank you.

15

seconded we adopt the Committee

16

motion, say Aye.

Seconded.
It has been moved and

report. All in favor of this

17

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS:

18

MR. SPEAKER:

Aye.

Cause in all?

The ayes have it.

19

It is now before us for consideration and explanation by

20

Representative Watkins.

21

Will you proceed?

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:

Mr. Speaker and members

22

of the House.

It is well known that employees of

23

corporations receive some definite tax benefits under our

24

federal law.

25

operated sole proprietorships have been able to form

And through the years individuals who have

xv l
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1

corporations and in effect become employees of their own

2

corporation, so that they too may participate along with the

3

rest of their employees for these benefits.

4

When it comes to the area of professional services,

5

there has been some questions in the ethics of the

6

professions as well as some possible question as to whether

7

say a doctor, could incorporation for the practice of his

8

profession.

9

The present House Bill 197 is a bill that would

10

enable professional individuals under regulation by their

11

own regulating board, as well as supervision by the

12

Secretary of State under the forming of the corporation.

13

But this Bill would enable professinal people to practice

14

their profession by the business means of a corporation.

15

would have no effect whatsoever, upon the personal

16

relationship treated between the doctor and his patient, for

17

example, or the dentist and his patient or the lawyer and

18

his client but would merely enable them to conduct their

19

business in a corporate form rather than as most of them do

20

now, as sole proprietorships or as partnerships.

21

I might mention this:

It

That this type legislation has

22

received very favorable treatment throughout the United

23

States.

24

problem and had formed or have enacted enabling legislation

25

of one kind of another to allow the same result. Several of

As of one year ago about 15 states had met this

2
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1

those had done it by means of a professional corporation

2

act.

Other states by allowing what they call an association

3

act.

As of today, one year later, about 23 or 24 states

4

have now passed this type of enabling legislation and, to my

5

knowledge, similar legislation is before most, if not all,

6

of the other states.

7

This is the basic purpose of the Act.

8

should say, a non-controversial bill.

9

the medical profession.

It is, I

It has the support of

It has the support of the dental

10

profession and other professions and I don't think that

11

there would be any particular objections.

12
13
14
15
16

If anyone has a question I'll be certainly happy to
do my best to answer it.
MR. SPEAKER:

Representative Leverage?

REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAGE:

Mr. Speaker, I should

like to ask Representative Watkins a question.

17

MR. SPEAKER:

Will you respond?

18

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:

19

REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAGE:

Yes.
In connection with

20

suits, liable suits, would these individuals still be

21

individually liable in the case of a suit of liable?

22

that in some instances corporations may not be, individuals

23

may not be sued but only the corporation.

24 I

be the status of these people?

25 I

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:
3
xviii

I know

Now, what would

I can read Section 10

1

I of the Act which states:

"This Act does not alter any law

2

| applicable to the relationship between a person rendering

3 I professional services and a person receiving such services,
4

including liability arising out of such professinal

5

services."

6

Therefore, the doctor, for example, who

7

incorporates, would not be given limited liability as most

8

corporations provide.

9

too:

That is the—I might mention this

The term has been coined "Professional Corporation"

10

for this very reason, to point out that the professional

11

ethics and the same standards that now exist between the

12

professional person and his client or patient will remain

13

even though he incorporates.

14

If there are no other questions, Mr. Speaker—

15

REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON:

Mr. Speaker, I should

16

like to ask Representative Watkins a question.

17

just briefly tell us what these tax advantages are with

18

regards to these professional people?

19

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:

Could you

The main tax advantage,

20

Mr.

Peterson, is the adoption of what we call profit

21

sharing or pension plans.

22

course, it can adopt a plan for the benefit of its

23

employees.

24

benefit of the employees, but in the partnership the partner

25 I

is not an employee, he is an employer.

Under the corporation, of

A partnership can do the same thing for the

xix

Whereas, under a

|

1

corporation, the owner-type person is both an employee as

2

well as an owner of stock.

3

that of the adoption of retirement plans such as pension and

4

profit sharing plans.
MR.

5

SPEAKER:

So this is the main benefit,

Any further questions?

6

question has been called for.

7

call the role on final passage.

9

I'll ask the chief clerk to
Representative Peterson?

REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON:

8

Mr.

Speaker, if there

is no opposition to this Bill I would move the rules be

10

suspended,

11

entire House in favor of this bill.

12

MR. SPEAKER:

13

The

The clerk be permitted to cast the vote of the

You heard the motion. All in

favor—

14

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

15

MR. SPEAKER:
All right.

(Inaudible).

Any final direction?

16

objections?

17

all in favor of this motion say aye.

Any other

All except Representative Anderson,

18

UNIDENTIFIES SPEAKERS:

19

MR. SPEAKER:

Aye.

All those no?

The ayes have it

20

and if you'll remain in your seats I will ask the chief

21

clerk to make the count.

22

END OF RECORDING.

23
24
25
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11
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12
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13
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14
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16
17
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18
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19
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20
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22
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23
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